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A number of developing countries have stressed credit 
policies to achieve agricultural goals. It is frequently 
difficult, however, to evaluate their effect ~ecause the amount 
of funds involved has been small or their impact has been masked 
by other development policies. The Brazilian case is revea~ing 
because huge amounts of credit have been channeled to 
agriculture, and credit policy stands out as a key component of 
agricultural policy during the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, the 
Brazilian experience provides insights into what countries might 
expect if and when they assign credit policies such an important 
role. Furthermore, commercial banks have been used almost 
exclusively to supply the credit rather than creating new 
specialized agricultural credit institutions. Thus, the 
Brazilian case provides some evidence into how an existing 
banking system can be used to service agricultural credit needs 
in a developing country. This paper analyzes Brazilian policy 
objectives and the impact of credit on agriculture over the 1960-
1982 period. 
Brazilian Agricultural and Credit Policies 
Like many Latin American countries, Brazil has heavily 
regulated its financial markets in pursuit of development goals 
(Eckaus). It is unique, however, because of the energy and 
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initiative with which it has pursued conventional and innovative 
prescriptions in the financial sphere {Yusaf). Portfolio 
ceilings and quotas, discount mechanisms, and reserve 
requirements have been extensively employed to affect bank 
behavior in developing countries (Johnson). These methods plus 
interest rate controls and regulations on bank mergers and 
expansion have been used in Brazil. The usual indirect 
mechanisms of monetary control have also been used to influence 
the supply of credit. 
Brazilian objectives for this intervention include 
modernization and increased efficiency in banking, enlarged 
financial services to less developed regions, and increased 
capital availability for particular economic sectors including 
agriculture. The strategy explicitly attempts to alter banking 
behavior through selective controls so resources flow to socially 
desired sectors and activities. The magnitude and 
comprehensiveness of the strategy suggests a "supply-leading" 
relationship between financial and economic development 
(Patrick). 
The institutional credit system for agriculture consists 
largely of private and "official" banks (Meyer et al.}. Official 
banks have various degrees of state and federal government 
ownership and capital and hold public sector deposits. The 
National Monetary Council and Central Bank Created in 1964 
provided the federal government with an effective means to 
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control bank behavior. Furthermore, a large part of agricultural 
credit comes from funds administered by the Central Bank and/or 
the federal Bank of Brazil. 
The stated objectives of agricultural credit were 
established in 1965 by the Agricultural Credit Law 4829: (a) 
finance a portion of operating costs of agricultural production 
and marketing, (b) stimulate capital formation, (c) accelerate 
the adoption of modern technology, and (d) strengthen the 
economic position of farmers, especially small and medium ones. 
An implicit but very important objective appears to have been the 
use of credit subsidies to compensate farmers for the price and 
exchange rate controls designed to stimulate industrialization 
and control inflation. Moreover/ credit policies have been used 
to address short-term problems like high fertilizer prices and 
the 1975 coffee freeze. Combining credit controls with product 
pricing policies has resulted in a comprehensive system for 
influencing factor use and output in agriculture. 
A vast number of rules, regulations, programs, and 
subprograms have been applied to agricultural credit. Each 
program has specific objectives, interest rates, and repayment 
schedules. However 1 three general features of agricultural 
credit policies need to be emphasized. First, nominal interest 
rates on agricultural loans have been controlled at rates lower 
than those permitted for other types of loans. During the last 
decades, these controls resulted in negative real rates of 
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interest (i.e., nominal interest rates lower than the rate of 
inflation). Second, incentives and controls have been used to 
induce banks to lend more of their awn deposits and/or government 
funds to agriculture. Third, nominal interest rates for small 
loans (supposedly made to small farmers) have been set 1 or 2 
percentage points below large loans. 
Credit and Performance of the Agricultural Sector 
The first major result of Brazilian credit policies has been 
a sharp expansion of formal credit supplies from 1960 through the 
end of the 1970s. Table 1 shows loans made each year and 
agricultural production far the 1960-82 period. Columns 1 and 2 
list operating loans, usually with terms of less than a year, 
which represent more than half of the number and value of loans 
made in recent years. The remainder of the credit is split 
between marketing loans 1 with terms of a few months and 
investment loans payable aver several years. 2 In this period, 
agricultural output approximately tripled . New loans made per 
year rase almost 14 times. The ratio of operating loans to 
agricultural output (column 6) rase from 0.06 in 1960 to 0.36 in 
1982 while the ratio of total loans to output rose from 0.12 to 
0.56. In 1975, the first ratio reached a peak of 0.37 and the 
second rose to 0.84 due, in part, to major funding for drought 
relief and coffee recuperation. These ratios are among the 
highest found in most other Latin American countries (Adams). In 
subsequent years, however, these ratios were substantially 
Table 1. -Agricultural Credit and OUtput, Brazil, 1960-SZ. 
Loa'1S Made During 'le.:t:-a Gress ['o;·"eS .... .ic 
-------------------------------------
?=oC.,· ct ( G::>?) from 
Operating r.oansb Total Agricultural loar.s Agriculture Ratio of Operating Ratio of Tota: 
Year 
---------------
-----------------------
!:1 t.oans Made to Agricultural Loans to 
Numberc Value in 1~75 Numberc value in 1a1s 1975 Agricultural Gi)p Agricul tura.l GD? 
Cruzeiros0 Cruzeiros Cruzeirosde (2/5) (4/5) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1960 112 3,180 231 6,176 49,957 0.06 0.12 
1961 184 3,280 285 6,157 50,755 0.06 0.12 
1962 337 4,910 441 8,382 57,883 0.08 0.14 
1963 416 4,410 549 7,267 49,131 0.09 0.15 
1964 527 6,560 771 9,864 54,365 0.12 0.18 
1965 509 5,730 665 8,483 57,366 0.10 o.:5 
1966 529 6,700 656 11,530 50,128 0.:3 0.23 
1967 633 9,040 1,029 : " '1~~ 5'3, :at ,.. ·-.... _! .., ~-~.~o 
1966 733 1~,470 1,500 21,019 53,'34: 0.22 0.33 
1969 675 9,624 1,:45 "'!"\ ........ ,..~ ,..,...,.. 0.17 0.36 ~lJ, ' .. o )ro 1 ("1Y't~"' 
1973 649 10,992 1, :n 24,548 5'3,75<: 0.20 0.46 
1971 686 ~2,394 :,253 28,481 61,009 0.20 0.47 
1972 687 14,706 1,266 35,321 67,702 0.22 0.52 
1973 771 21,288 1,400 49,852 87,699 0.24 0.56 
1974 789 27,757 1,450 61,648 100,914 0.28 0.61 
1975 1,076 39,446 1,856 89,997 107,349 0.37 0.84 
1976 1,059 38,886 1,832 92,143 140,252 0.27 0.66 
1917 1,011 38,901 1,722 82,266 172,536 0.23 0.48 
1978 1,104 45,698 1,896 83,659 167,859 0.27 0.50 
1979 1,375 52,433 2,373 104,248 183,203 0.28 0.57 
1980 1,876 56,406 2,766 99,686 191,333 0.29 0.52 
1981 1,944 50,705 2,613 86,458 172,386 0.29 0.50 
1982 1,826 53,857 2,604 83,725 150,484 0.36 0.56 
a Source: Various Central Bank and Bank of Brazil reports (Brazil, Banco Central). Figures represent number and value 
of new loans made. 
b From 1960 to 1968, the estimates for operating loans are based on :oans made ay the Bank of Brazil, which was 
responsible for the ma~ority of agricultural credit lent dunng the period. 
c Thousarrls of loans. 
d 1 million cruzeiros. Values adjusted by the index "2" of Conjuntura Economica (Brazil, Fundacao Getulio Vargas). 
e Source: Braz.il, Fundacao Getulio Vargas. 
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less. The droughts of 1981 and 1982 reduced the value of 
agricultural output so the ratios appeared more favorable than 
they would have been if output would have followed its upward 
trend. 
Piza compared the indebtedness of agriculture relative to 
other sectors. He found the credit output ratio for agriculture 
grew much faster in recent years. Although Brazil's general 
economic development strategy is oriented towards accelerating 
development through financial means, the agricultural sector has 
been especially favored with subsidized credit. 
No comprehensive study exists on agricultural capital 
formation. Schuh cited data suggesting the structure of farm 
capital shifted away from real estate between 1940 and 1965, wile 
the share in equipment rose. The 1970 census shows that land and 
buildings represented 68% of total capital assets, 18% in 
productive and work animals, 9% in permanent crops, and 5% in 
farm machinery and vehicles (Brazil, Funda9ao Institute 
Bras1leiro de Geograpfia e Estatistica). In the 1980 census, 
these proportions were 74% for land and buildings, 12% for 
animals, 9.6% for permanent crops and 4.4% for machinery and 
vehicles. Thus, contrary to earlier evidence, the value of land 
and buildings still commands a large and growing share of farm 
capital because of increases in farming area and land prices. 
Some of the rapid increases in credit may have been capitalized 
in land prices. 
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Credit policies have encouraged the adoption of both 
biological and mechanical technology. Programs have been 
introduced to finance so-called "modern inputs" including 
improved seeds, fertilizer, lime, agricultural chemicals, and 
livestock rations. Nominal interest rates for these programs 
varied from 0 to 7% much of the time. Likewjse, purchasers of 
domestically manufactured machinery have benefited from five-year 
loans with nominal interest rates ranging up to 15%, occasionally 
with a two-year initial grace period. Chemical fertilizer use 
rose from 380,000 metric tons in 1966 to a peak of 4.2 million 
tons in 1980, then fell to 2.7 million in 1982. Allegedly, the 
quantity of fertilizer supposedly financed in some regions has 
exceeded the amount actually sold. Domestic tractor production 
per year grew from 6,300 units in 1967 to over 70,000 in 1976 and 
then declined to 37,610 units in 19823 (Brazil, Instituto de 
Economia Agricola) . 
For the 1970 census, farmers reported investing Cr$ 4.4 
billion (in cruzeiros) in on-farm investments. Of this total, 
Cr$2.2 billion was spent for machinery, livestock, and permanent 
crops, all of which were eligible for credit. The Central Bank 
reported Cr$2.5 billion in new institutional loans for 
agricultural investments that year (Brazil, Banco Central). In 
the 1980 census, aggregate on-farm investments amounted to Cr$ 
579.1 billion (25.2 billion in cruzeiros of 1970), of which Cr 
$359.7 billion (15.6 billion in cruzeiros of 1970) were eligible 
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for institutional loans. However, Central Bank statistics 
indicate only 7.0 billion (in cruzeiros of 1970) as the total 
value of new ~ D'7estment loans contracted by farmers in 1980, 
suggesting that the farmers self-financed a considerable amount 
of on-farm inv~stment. 
Over 50% of the investment loans were reported for machinery 
purchase, and almost two-thirds of these loans were made in the 
states of Rio Grande do Su1, Parana, and Sao Paulo, which 
accounted for over 70% of the tractors reported on farms in 1970 
and 1980. It is quite likely, then, that credit for investment 
has been highly correlated with new machinery purchases and on-
farm investments.4 This conclusion is consistent with the 
tractor demand models estimated by Sanders for 1950-71, and by 
Barros for 1960-76. The variable for real value of tractor 
financing overshadowed the variable measuring tractor price 
relative to agricultural wage rates in both studies. 
Distribution of Farms and Credit 
Table 2 shows the size distribution of farms as reported in 
the 1970 and 1980 censuses.5 The total number of farms increased 
from 3.3 million in 1960 to 4.9 million in 1970, and to 5.2 
million in 1970, and to 5.2 million in 1980. The total farm area 
increased from about 250 million hectares in 1960 to almost 295 
million in 1970 to 365 million in 1980. From 1960 to 1970, over 
a million new farms were added to the less than 10 hectares 
group, while the 1980 census reports an increase of only 78.4 
Table 2 - Size Distribution of Farms8 , Brazil, 1970 and 1980. 
1970 Census 1980 Census 
Fann Size Strata (Ha.) Farms Percent Percent of Fanns Percent Percent of 
Number Percent of Areab Product Number Percent of Areab Product 
Less than 10 2,519,630 51.1 3.1 17.8 2,598,019 50.4 2.5 13.0 
10 to less than 100 1,934,392 39.3 20.4 40.0 2,016,774 39.1 17.7 37.7 
100 to less than 1 , 000 414,746 8.4 37.0 29.3 488,521 9.5 34.8 33.2 
1,000 to less than 10,000 35,425 0.7 27.2 10.7 45,496 0.9 28.7 13.9 
10,000 + 1,449 <0.1 12.3 :i.9 2,345 <0.1 16.5 2.1 
No Farm Size Reported 18,377 0.4 - 0.3 8,696 0.2 
- 0.1 
Total 4,924,019 99.9 100.0 100.0 5,159,851 100.0 100.2 100.0 
SOv"RGE: Fu..1"Jdac;:ao Ir>..stittto Brasi:ie.iro de Geq;ra:'ia e Estatist.icc; (Ag!":c-..::~,·-"a.:. Ce::1'3'-'S, :970 and l980). 
a !::1 the Brazil.!an census, farms are defined as "establ.ishments". A farm ~s a unit with one or more a.::.jacent parce.i.s unue!: a 
sing1e administration. Two nonadjacent parcels are treated as sP.:;-.a;·Qte :arms, even if they are under a single aeministration. 
Likewise parcels are treated separately even though owned by the same person if they are rented or sharecropped to two different 
persons with separate administration. 
b An 1lllkncJwn bias exists in these data due to the farms not reporting size. 
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thousand farms in this group. During the 1960-1980 period the 
average size of the less than 10 hectares group increased from 
almost 4 to 3.5 hectares. 
The inverse relationship between farm size and value of 
production noted in several countries was found in Brazil in 1970 
and 1980. In the latter period, the first two size strata 
represented 89% of the farms with only 20% of the area, but 51% 
of the productjon. Units of 10,000 or more hectares represented 
less than 0.1% of the farms, 16% of the area, but only 2% of the 
production. 
Surprisingly, almost 80% of the Brazilian farms reported no 
credit from any formal or informal source in the 1980 census. 
Even allowing for possible data limitations, credit use was much 
less widespread than anticipated. About one-third of the farms 
in the upper thTee size strata reported receiving loans. Only 4% 
of the farms in the smallest strata reported loans. Thus, a 
significant number of farms in the country were still untouched 
by formal credit programs in 1980. As shown in Table 3, during 
the 1970s farms in the upper three size strata were benefited by 
these programs, while farms in the smallest strata were worsened 
in relative terms. 
Table 3 also reports the distribution of total volume of 
credit. Government entities provided 87% of the Cr$ 347 billion 
in credit reported in 1980. The two smallest farm size strata 
received far less credit than their share of farm numbers, while 
Table 3 -Value and Distribution of credit Received by Farm Size, Brazil, 1970 and 1980. 
Sources of Credit (1970) Sources of Credit (1980) 
All Government OUter All Government ot:her 
Sources Entities Sources a Sources Entities Sources a 
Total Value: 
Value in cruzeiros of 1980b 95,182,934 75,121,831 20,061,103 347,031,189 301,506,878 45,524,310 
Percent 100.0 78.9 21.1 100.0 87.1 12.9 
% 
Size Strata (Ha.): 
Less than 10 5.5 4.2 10.4 4.9 4.5 7.4 
10 to less than 100 33.1 33.4 31.7 31.7 31.7 31.8 
~00 to less than 1 , 000 4.1.8 44.2 32.6 42.0 43.3 3t;,.6 
1-' 
1-' 
:,coo to :ess t~~n 1~,0~8 ::;.~: -~ ~ ...... .:... 
- J. ~ 18.1 17.6 :9.9 
10,000 + 4.0 2.9 7.7 3.3 2.8 7.0 
No farm size reported 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 <0.1 
Total 100.1 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.1 100.1 
a Tne 1970 Census reports the volume of credit from individuals and p~ivate entities, while the 1980 Census reports separately the 
volume of credit from cooperatives a~ combines credit from other sources. 
b 1 thousand cruzerios (real value adjusted by the IGP Inde." from Fundagao GetUlio Vargas). 
SOURCE: Fundagao Institute Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatlstica (Agricultural Census, 1970 and 1980). 
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the three larg~r groups received far more. Considering farm 
area, however, the first three strata received more credit than 
the~r , - . ~ana snare. Considering value of production, the two 
smallest strata received less credit than warranted by their 
production, whj]e the 100 to 1,000 hectare group appeared to be 
especially favored with credit from government entities. Thus, 
according to the 1970 and 1980 census, Brazilian policy makers 
had not succeeded in increasing the share of agricultural credit 
lent to small farmers. 
An analysis of the regional distribution of credit showed 
that approximately 75% went to the most commercialized 
agricultural regions. Farmers in the state of Sao Paulo alone 
produced 20% of the 1970 agricultural output and received one-
fourth of total credit. Estimates of that state's credit to 
output ratio were even higher than for the rest of the nation. 
Contrary to the national trends, results from farm surveys 
suggested that this state was increasing the share of credit 
going to small farmers. In 1980 this picture changed somewhat so 
that farmers in Sao Paulo produced 19% of the Brazilian farm 
production and received 21% of total credit. The credit share in 
the states of Parana and Rio Grande do Sul was essentially 
unchanged while it increased in the states of Goias and Mato 
Grosso where the cultivated area was expanding rapidly. 
Agricultural credit policy changed substantially after 1980 
(Araujo, 1983a). External and internal debt problems, inflation 
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rates ranging from 120 to 150% per year, and the high social cost 
and economic distortions prevailing in the financ!al markets 
induced policy makers to implement a set of restrictive economic 
measures in 1981 and in 1983 that affected the entire 
agricultural sector. The real value of total farm credit 
declined 20% from 1979 to 1982, as a consequence of reduction 
both in the supply of and in the demand for credit. 
The supply of agricultural loan funds was affected by the 
volume and composition of bank financial assets. During much of 
this period commercial banks were obligated to lend to farmers 
approximately 25% of their demand deposits. At the beginning of 
the 1980's, the effects of growing inflation rates and the 
indexation of some financial assets led to a radical change in 
the composition of bank assets. This can be seen in the rapid 
decline of the share of the demand deposits in the composition of 
total financial assets: 46% in 1970 vs. 28% in 1980 (Oliveira). 
The implicit subsidy in interest rates increased 
geometrically from 1974 to 1979 due to a steady rise in the rate 
of inflation, and to the rigidity of nominal interest rates 
(Araujo, 1983b). This subsidy is an indicator of the social cost 
associated with the credit policy. The Brazilian case is 
revealing because the rising social costs of providing cheap and 
abundant credit to agriculture eventually had to be adjusted to 
the objectives and needs of a more realistic and moderate 
monetary policy. This implicit subsidy was equivalent to Cr$ 
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0.07 per unit of farm output in 1974, and climbed to Cr$ 0.15 in 
1979. In 1982. this subsidy was estimated in Cr$ 0.08 per unit 
of output.6 
Conclusions and Implications 
Brazilian policy makers have established a complex set of 
controls and incentives to increase the quantity and lower the 
cost of agricultural loans. The volume of formal credit lent to 
farmers sharply increased during the 1960's and early 1970's. 
But most farmers still do not receive this credit, and the amount 
going to small farmers is especially low. Agricultural output 
and the use of some modern inputs have expanded. However, since 
value of production is a criterion for lending, it is difficult 
to establish a clear line of causality between credit and 
agricultural performance. The expansion in use of modern inputs 
is associated with the increase in formal credit, but there also 
has likely been some substitution of external for internal funds. 
The banks' response to the distortions introduced in the 
financial market is understandable. Compensating balances and 
noninterest costs and fees are widely used to increase returns 
from agricultural loans. Banks with a clear profit orientation 
have been especially reluctant to increase long-term agricultural 
lending. Loan procedures are cumbersome and increase borrowing 
costs. As d~mand deposits fell as a share of the total bank 
financial assets, so did the supply of agricultural loan funds. 
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Two important unanswered questions exist regarding the 
Brazilian experience. First, what would have been the demand for 
credit if agriculture would have been less discriminated against 
through price controls, overvalued exchange rates, and export 
controls? Second, would bank performance have been better, 
especially on equity grounds, if there would have been more 
incentives for agricultural lending? The two questions appear to 
be related. A justification for subsidized interest rates is to 
offset the discrimination of other policies. But interest rate 
controls reduce bank profitability. Thus, a logical tendency by 
banks is to reduce costs by lending to large farmers and to use 
nonprice methods to allocate credit. 
Commercial banks can play an important role in financing 
agriculture in developing countries. The Brazilian experience 
suggests that establishing an appropriate set of incentives is 
crucial in affecting back behavior. Flexible interest rates and 
simplified lending procedures are essential. General lines of 
credit should be created to meet agricultural development 
objectives. A special line of credit, including loans for land 
purchase, is probably required if the economic position of small 
farmers is to be improved. However, the proliferation of 
specific credit programs to resolve specific short-term 
agricultural problems must be avoided. 
The Brazilian case also demonstrates the dilemma that can 
emerge between agricultural credit policies and macroeconomic 
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policies, especially monetary policies. Significant changes were 
made in agric111tural credit policy in the early 1980s bPcause nf 
needed adjustments in macroeconomic policies. The inflationary 
effects of large amounts of agricultural credit were no longer 
supportable. Also beginning in the 1980's, policy makers began 
to look toward~ other policy instruments to stimulate the 
agricultural sector. Minimum price programs, investments in 
human capital, trade and commercial programs, and agrarian reform 
will likely play increasingly significant roles compared to 
credit policy !:1 the coming years. It is relevant to note, 
however, that there still remains a crucial issue for the 
Brazilian policymakers, namely to define and establish a stable 
and long-term strategy to accelerate agricultural development. 
In this new framework, credit policy could be gradually adjusted 
to become primarily an instrument to increase farmers' liquidity 
rather than bejng used as a short-run or even an emergency policy 
instrument. 
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FOOTNOTES 
* 
** 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
This paper is an updated and expanded version of an earlier 
paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Association of Agricultural Economics (AAAE) i~ July 1977. a 
summarized version of that paper was published in the 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, December 1977. 
Paulo F. C. de Araujo is a full professor, University of Sao 
PauJo, Brazil, and Richard L. Meyer is a full professor, The 
Ohio State University. The authors gratefully acknowledge 
the assistance of Iby Pedroso, Caio Yamaguishi, Luiz 
Henrique Piva and Ricardo Shirota in assembling the data 
used in the original paper and this revision, and the 
comments by Dale Adams, Doug Graham, Donald Larson, Warren 
Lee, G. Edward Schuh and Geraldo S.A.C. Barros on the 
original version. The normal disclaimers apply. 
Substantial amounts of marketing loans go to individuals 
other than farmers. Thus, column 2 underestimates the total 
short-term credit obtained by farmers, while column 4 
overestimates total credit. 
Little institutional credit is available for farm real 
estate mortgages, so investment loans are lent largely to 
finance machinery, livestock, and perennial crops. 
From 1980 to 1983 a contraction was observed in the demand 
for both fertilizers and tractors. 
In 1980 the supply of institutional credit for investments 
exhibited a substantial decline. 
See footnote b, table 2, regarding the definition of a farm 
used in the census. 
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6. The rates of subsidy for each line of credit implicit in 
interest r~tes were estimated using the following formula: 
(r-i).t 
( 1 + j) 
where· 
r = nominal interest rate (annual basis) 
i = annual rate of inflation 
t= weis~t coefficients for the duration of different 
credit lines. 
The coefficients used were 0.75 for operating loans, 1.0 for 
investment loans, and 0.25 for marketing loans. 
